

(様式第2号)

研究No. (記載不要)	— —
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平成 18 年度配分 研究成果発表報告書(実績)

研究名	コミュニティにおける多文化状況の国際比較				
配分を受けた特別研究費	文化政策学部長特別研究費				2300 千円
研究者氏名 (代表者)	学部名	学科名	職	氏名	共同研究者
	文化政策	国際文化	教授	馬場 孝	他 5 名
発表の方法	1 紀要 名称: 池上重弘. 「日本とオーストラリアの高等教育機関における インドネシア人留学生－統計分析にもとづく最近 の動向分析－」			号数	第 7 号 (7頁～19頁) (2008年3月発行)
	2 学会等での発表 学会等名: 別紙参照			発表日	平成 年 月 日
	3 その他 発表の方法: 別紙参照			発表日	平成 年 月 日

- 学会等での発表及びその他の場合は、学会報等発表を証する資料を添付すること。
- 配分を受けた翌年度の3月末までに提出

研究成果の実績報告の詳細（2007年3月31日現在）

■1■ 活字での発表

1. 紀要

池上重弘. 2007. 「日本とオーストラリアの高等教育機関におけるインドネシア人留学生－統計資料の分析にもとづく最近の動向分析－」『静岡文化芸術大学研究紀要』7:7-19.

2. 学会誌等

イシカワ エウニセ アケミ. 2006. 「家族は子供の教育にどうかかわるか」編著: 広田照幸『子育て・しつけ』日本図書センター, pp. 290-303, 総頁374

イシカワ エウニセ アケミ. 2007. 「進学を果たした日系ブラジル人の若者の学校経験」科研費(平成16年～18年度)科学研究費補助金(基盤研究B(1)課題番号16330109)研究代表者: 宮島喬『外国人児童・生徒の就学問題の家族的背景と就学支援ネットワークの研究』pp. 75-87. 総頁157.

■2■ 学会等での発表

1. 学会・研究会での発表

Baba, Takashi. 2007. Human Security Reconsidered: Through the Braudelian Looking Glass with an IR Framework. International Studies Association at Chicago, Illinois, USA (2007年3月1日)

池上重弘. 「日本とオーストラリアにおけるインドネシア人留学生の動向」神田外語大学異文化コミュニケーション研究所共同研究プロジェクト「日本のインドネシア人社会」第4回ワークショップ(2006年9月30日 於神田外語大学)

イシカワ エウニセ アケミ. Cultural and Language Barriers inside the Families – The case of Japanese-Brazilian Families in Japan – (「在日日系ブラジル人家族内における言語・文化の壁」) XVI ISA World Congress of Sociology (第16回国際社会学会(ISA)大会) July 23rd to 29th, 2006, in Durban, South Africa. (2006年7月)

イシカワ エウニセ アケミ. 「在日日系ブラジル人女性」日本移民学会第17回年次大会(大阪商業大学)(2007年6月)

2. 学内研究会

第1回研究会 (2006年12月9日に静岡文化芸術大学にて開催)

池上重弘. 「日本とオーストラリアの統計資料に見るインドネシア人留学生」

イシカワ エウニセ アケミ. 「浜松市における日系ブラジル人児童・生徒の教育の実態」

下楠昌哉. 「北アイルランドのコミュニティにおける多文化状況と文化活動の研究」

第2回研究会 (2007年1月19日に静岡文化芸術大学にて開催)

馬場孝. 「『東アジア共同体』構想: 議論の枠組みと展望」

鈴木元子. 「ニューヨークにおける多文化状況－視察・調査報告－」

岡田建志. 「フランスにおけるベトナム系住民」

■3■その他

鈴木元子. 「モザイク都市ニューヨークー多文化状況の観点からー」静岡県西部英語教育研究会にて講演
(2007年8月3日)

鈴木元子. 2007年6月7日/14日、静岡文化芸術大学の「都市文明論」の授業の中で、撮影してきた写真を
学生たちに見せ、講義に一部成果を反映させた。

日本移民学会 第17回年次大会プログラム

日本移民学会第17回年次大会を以下の要領で開催いたします。

つきましては同封いたしました「出欠票」にご記入の上、5月26日(土)必着で、郵送、FAX、または電子メールにて大会実行委員会までご返信くださいますようお願いいたします。

■大会開催日時: 2007年6月23日(土)、24日(日)

■会場: 大阪商業大学

■出欠票の送り先

日本移民学会第17回年次大会実行委員会

■ 問い合わせ先

- ▶ 【大会担当者】 飯田耕二郎 (E-Mail) iida@daioshodai.ac.jp (FAX) 06-6781-8438
- ▶ 【事務局】 森本豊富 (E-mail) imingakkai@yahoo.co.jp (電話・FAX) 04-2947-6789

大会テーマ「労働力としての移民女性と日本社会」

■大会第1日目 6月23日(土)

- ◆ 9:30~10:30 四役会議(449 講義室)
- ◆ 10:30~12:30 第二回運営委員会(449 講義室)
- ◆ 12:00~ 受付開始(3階エレベーターホール)
- ◆ 13:00~13:50 ▲ビデオ上映(432 講義室)
Stand up for Justice: The Ralph Lazo Story
第2次世界大戦中、二世の友人たちとマンザナ収容所で2年半の歳月を過ごしたメキシコ人とアイルランド人の血を引くラルフ・ラゾのドキュメンタリー・フィルム。

13:00~13:50 ▲ラウンド・テーブル(4411 講義室)

- テーマ「移民研究の最前線: 移民研究の軌跡と展望
—学際的研究分野としての可能性—」
- 司会: 椿 真智子、報告者: 森本豊富、ディスカッサント: 菅 美弥

◆14:00~16:50 シンポジウム(432 講義室)

- ▶ テーマ「労働力としての移民女性と日本社会」
- ▶ 趣旨説明 村川庸子(敬愛大学国際学部)
- ▶ 報告者
 - ◇ 武田 文(関西学院大学)「フィリピン女性エンターテナーのライフストーリー」
 - ◇ イシカワ エウニセ アケミ(静岡文化芸術大学)「在日日系ブラジル人女性」
 - ◇ 柳 蓮淑(御茶ノ水女子大学博士後期課程)「定住化する移住女性と地域社会
—山形県在住の韓国人妻の事例を中心に—」

- ▶ コメンテーター: 田中宏(龍谷大学)、村井忠政(名古屋市立大学)
- ▶ 趣旨説明: 山形県在住の韓国人妻の事例を中心に

日本の少子高齢化の危機感を背景に、外国人労働者受入れに関する議論が盛んである。積極的受入を求める財界に対し、政府は不熟練労働者の受入には慎重な構えだが、現実には研修や留学生、不法入国などの形で就労する者の数は急増しており、平成12年末現在で外国人人口は131万人1千人、既に総人口の1.03%、平成7年から12年の5年間で14.9%の増加となっている。かつて外国人人口の大半を占めていた在日韓国・朝鮮人は高齢化により減少傾向が進み、他方で1980年代以降に来日し、定住したニューカマーが急増している。ニューカマーには中国・韓国出身者も多く含まれている。

様々な懸念材料をはらんだ問題であるが、今年のシンポジウムでは女性、特にニューカマーとして来日している女性移民に注目していきたい。原則として日系人以外の一の単純労働に就労ビザを発給しない政策をとる日本ではあるが、先述の通り日本で働く外国人の数は急増中である。暴力団がらみの風俗店での売春、不潔で危険な職場での労働が行われていると指摘される。観光ビザで来日し、期限が切れても不法滞在を続けて就労する者は摘発されれば強制送還される。他方で、嫁不足の農村などに嫁ぐ外国人花嫁も増加していると聞く。このような現代の日本の移民問題は、特に女性移民に関しては性風俗の問題、再生産の問題などと絡み、必ずしも実態が知られておらず、十分な議論がなされてこなかったように思われる。昨年はフィリピンとの自由貿易協定による看護士・介護士の導入がホットな問題となったが、このような状況の中でこの問題を現時点で考えておくことは本学会にとっても必要なことではないかと考えている。

今回のシンポの第一報告は山形県の農村への韓国人花嫁、第二報告は在日ブラジル人女性、第三報告はフィリピンエンターテナーに関する永年の調査に基づく実態調査報告である。

- ◆ 17:00~17:50 総会①(432 講義室)
- ◆ 18:00~19:30 懇親会(4号館1階 食堂 S-terrace)

大会第2日目 6月24日(日)

- ◆ 8:30~9:30 第3回運営委員会
- ◆ 9:30~12:30 自由論題報告

A会場(433 講義室)	司会: 和泉真澄(同志社大)、物部ひろみ(同志社大)
岩村益典 国立台湾師範大学歴史研究所 所博士候選人	日本統治時代の台湾花蓮港における農業官営移民の性格と位置づけ—植民地主義・帝国主義との関連に於いて—
デイ多佳子 北イリノイ州立大学人事部	ジュン・フジター1920年代の激動のシカゴを記録した日本人報道写真家—
深 豊幸 同志社大学大学院アメリカ研究科博士後期課程	カリフォルニア州グレーンジ(California State Grange): 同州の農民組織による日本人移民排斥運動への関与の過程に関する考察
中村茂生 立教大学アジア地域研究所 研究員	ブラジル日本移民の開祖: 水野龍像の再検討—伝記の整理と評価の更新—

(様式第2号)

研究No. (記載不要)	— —
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平成 年度配分 研究成果発表報告書(実績)

研究名					
配分を受けた 特別研究費	特別研究費				千円
研究者氏名 (代表者)	学部名	学科名	職	氏 名	共同研究者
					他 名
発表の方法	1 紀 要 名 称:			号 数	第 号 (頁~ 頁) (年 月発行)
	2 学会等での発表 馬場孝 学会等名:International Studies Association			発表日	平成 19年 3月 1日
	3 その他 発表の方法:			発表日	平成 年 月 日

- 学会等での発表及びその他の場合は、学会報等発表を証する資料を添付すること。
- 配分を受けた翌年度の3月末までに提出



INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION

October 1, 2006
baba@suac.ac.jp

Takashi Baba
2-1-1 Chuo

Hamamatsu Shizuoka 430-8533 Japan

Dear Takashi Baba:

We are pleased to inform you that your proposal for paper and/or roundtable participation in the 48th ISA Annual Convention in Chicago, IL, USA has been accepted and placed on the preliminary program. With a very exciting program, the 2007 ISA meeting in Chicago is the largest in the history of the Association. It will take place from February 28th through March 3rd, 2007 at the Hilton Chicago.

Please find below a listing of the panel(s) or event(s) in which you are scheduled to participate. Please keep this information for future reference and inform us immediately if any corrections are necessary so that we can incorporate them into the final program. Please note that e-mail address information will not appear on the final program the ISA webpage, and you should keep a record of this letter for a future correspondence with your panelists.

You should assume that any proposal you made that does not appear below could not be accommodated. We had to turn down many fine proposals this year because the number of proposals that were submitted far exceeded the space available for panels. Your proposal's acceptance in the program is testimony of its very high quality and worthy contribution to our program.

PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING CRITICAL PIECES OF INFORMATION:

First, if you are unable to attend the conference and participate in the capacities outlined in this email, please contact us directly at <isa2007@sfsu.edu> AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Second, if you withdraw from participation in the conference without a legitimate reason and do not inform us by DECEMBER 1, 2007, ISA regulations will prevent you from making a presentation for the ISA convention in the future. Legitimate reasons will be evaluated by ISA on a case by case basis. Please note that YOU MUST INFORM THE PROGRAM CHAIR DIRECTLY at the above email address of your desire to withdraw.

Third, starting last year, ISA has instituted a new procedure regarding the participation of non-ISA members on the program. We request that you please pre-register for the program no later than by OCTOBER 16th. If you fail to do so we will assume that you will not be participating in ISA 2007 and we will rearrange the program by removing your contribution and adding those who have currently been placed on a considerably long waiting list. We have received the largest number of submissions in the history of ISA this year. As a result, we had to decline very worthy proposals from hundreds of applicants due to space limitations.

We warmly welcome the participation of non-ISA members from all over the world as we think that they greatly contribute to our Association. ISA introduced the new procedure to streamline the complex process of preparing our annual conference, which requires us to work with thousands of people around the world. We apologize for any inconvenience that this new procedure might cause you.

In previous years, some non-ISA members have been, for various reasons, unable to meet their professional commitments to present at ISA meetings. In an attempt to limit these occurrences to only those with legitimate reasons, this new procedure was instituted. We hope that this will help ensure full participation at the ISA 2007 meeting. You may pre-register via the web at <<http://www.isanet.org/chicago2007/register.html>>. If you pre-register but decide not to attend a conference, your pre-registration fee will be refunded depending on your reason for withdrawal which will be evaluated by ISA on a case by case basis.

Fourth, please remember to reserve your room accommodations at <http://www.hilton.com/en/hi/groups/personalized/chichhh_isn/index.jhtml>. Please note that, historically, the host hotel guest rooms fill up by mid November. Hotel information, room rates and registration information can be obtained via the web at <<http://www.isanet.org/chicago2007/hotel.html>>.

Fifth, ISA is offering childcare facilities during the conference for ISA members only. If you anticipate needing these services, please register as soon as possible since space is limited. You may read about Kiddie Corp, the nationally recognized childcare organization with which ISA has partnered, and register on-line by visiting the ISA website at <<https://www.kiddiecorp.com/isakids.htm>>.

Please note that, as in previous years, overhead projectors and screens are provided in all panel rooms. If you are interested in utilizing additional Audio Visual equipment, (LCD projector, PowerPoint presentation materials, laptop rentals, etc.) you must make arrangements directly with the Hilton Chicago's Audio Visual department. PLEASE NOTE THAT PRESENTERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL CHARGES INCLUDING LABOR AND SET-UP. LCD RENTALS COST APPROXIMATELY \$300.00 PER DAY.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. Thank you for your fine proposal. We very much welcome and appreciate your participation in ISA 2007 and look forward to seeing you in Chicago next February-March.

Sincerely,

Andrei P. Tsygankov
2007 ISA Program Chair
International Relations / Political Science
San Francisco State University

Participant: Takashi Baba

Preliminary Program 2007

TB04 Thursday 10:30 AM - 12:15

Non-traditional Security: Theory and Practice

Sponsor(s): Convention Theme Global Development

Chair(s)

Yusuke Dan

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Phone: +45 45 89 08 09

Can Words Change the World?: Theoretical Implications of "Human Security" for International Relations and its Applicability as Policy Guidelines

Takashi Baba

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Energy Security and Environmental Protection: The Case of Sakhalin Development

Hiroyuki Fujimaki

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Hiratsuka Kanagawa 259-1292 Japan

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Phone: +81-463-58-1211

Human Security in Practice: The Case of Food Security

Naoto Yoshikawa

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Non-Traditional Security Discussed: The Debates in Japan on Post-Conflict Contributions

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Discussant(s)

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Paper prepared for presentation at:

The 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association

Feb. 28 - March 3, 2007

Chicago, Illinois, USA

“Human Security” Reconsidered:

Through the Braudelien Looking Glass with an IR Framework

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Introduction

Johan Galtung has recently argued that concepts come and go; they do not stay around forever. Currently, “Human security” is in, “humanitarian intervention” is out (Galtung: 2004:1). Of all the concepts that come into fashion at one point or another, some succeed and flourish over time, while others fail and vanish quickly. This leaves open the possibility that within a decade the term “human security” itself will become completely obsolete, despite the eternal significance of the security of people per se (Hatsuse: 2003/4: 95).

Born and articulated in the 1994 UNDP (Human Development Report), this newly invented concept has successfully survived its “infancy” stage. It has become part of the policy agenda in fifteen countries (Girshick: 2006: 12), thirteen of which comprise the Human Security Network with Norway and Canada as founding states.

Instead of launching into the ongoing debates over the definition of the concept itself (Burgess & Owen et. al: 2004:345-387), this paper takes a different approach from previous research by adopting International Relations as a perspective through which to view the concept of human security and to explore its scope, potentials, agendas, and challenges.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, it puts forward a framework previously devised by the author elsewhere (Baba: 1998). Simple as it is, the framework provides us with several analytical advantages. Second, the framework is applied to cross examining the concept of human security with the main IR perspectives. Some attempts are made to juxtapose the hypothetical trajectories of the term with preceding “successful” concepts. Third, and by way of conclusion, the framework is reformulated provisionally to view, review, and overview the human security approach.

1 Framework

The framework is boldly simple and uncomplicated. It is a combination of the “Levels of Analysis in International Relations” and the “Different Speeds of

Time in History” in the Braudelian sense of the term.

(1) Levels of analysis

The first component, the levels of analysis in IR, is not expounded in detail here. It was first introduced into the vocabulary of IR by David Singer (Singer: 1960), who reviewed Waltz’s celebrated book, *Man, the State and War* (Waltz: 1959). While being critically examined by a number of scholars (eg. Buzan: 1995), it has been widely accepted among researchers engaged in empirical studies as well as those actively partaking in IR pedagogy. This paper adopts “the most common taxonomy in the field” (Griffiths and O’Callaghan: 2002: 178): individual, state/domestic, and international, with slight modification to the second level from domestic to domestic/state. The individual level focuses on the personality, perceptions, choices, and activities of individuals. The course of international relations is treated as the consequences of the actions and interactions of individuals. The state/domestic level is concerned with the characteristics of the state, the type of government, the process of domestic politics, or the behavior of interest groups. The course of international relations is treated as the consequence of the domestic politics and the behavior of states. The international level addresses itself to the characteristics of the international system, the development of international institutions, or the activities of international organizations. The course of international relations is treated as the consequences of the nature and the development of the international system (Griffiths and O’Callaghan: 2003:179, Mingst: 2004: 59-60, Holsti: 1992: 5-7 etc.).

It is important to point out here that each “level” has come to include a far greater number of factors or actors as the influences which affect the course of international relations, with good reason, than it originally did when the idea was first introduced.

What is more noteworthy is that there are various factors, actors, institutions, processes, and even structures operating at each level. Goldstein remarks that “[t]he processes at higher levels tend to operate more slowly than those on the lower levels. Individuals go in and out of office

often; the structure of the international system changes rarely” (Goldstein: 1999:19). This is not always the case, however. Waltz’s original focus in the “lower level” – individual level, was on “human nature”, which operates the most slowly. The “interest groups” at the domestic level presumably operate no less swiftly than the individual decision makers. In other words, each level contains factors, actors, institutions and processes which operate at “different speeds of time”. This realization leads us to the introduction of the second component.

(2) Different speeds of time

In his celebrated book, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillippe II*, Fernand Braudel argued that history can be viewed from the perspective of three different speeds of time. In another essay on history, he summarizes his position as follows:

History exists at different levels, I would even go so far as to say three levels [...]. On the surface, the history of events works itself out in the short term: it is a sort of microhistory. Halfway down, a history of conjunctures follows a broader, slower rhythm. [...] And over and above the “rectiatif” of the conjuncture, structural history or the history of the longue duree, inquires into whole centuries at a time (Braudel: 1980(1969): 74).

One is, therefore, the history of events; the short time span. It is also called “individual time” in which change is fastest and most conspicuous to people. He writes:

Lastly the third part [of the book] gives a hearing to traditional history [...] the history of events: surface disturbances, crests of foam that the ideas of history carry on their strong backs. A history of brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations, by definition ultra-sensitive: the least tremor sets all its antennae quivering. But as such it is the most exciting of all, the richest in human interest, and also the most dangerous (Braudel: 1995(1949): 21).

Events are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like fireflies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into darkness and as often as not into oblivion. Every event, however brief, has to be sure a contribution to make, lights up some dark corner or even some wide vista of history (Braudel: Ibid: 901).

Thus, “individual time” primarily pertains to conventional political and diplomatic history. It is, he describes, “on the scale not of man, but of individual men.” “Resounding events are often only momentary outbursts, surface manifestations of these larger movements and explicable only in terms of them” (Braudel: Ibid: 21).

A second is the medium-span or “conjunctural” perspective where historical change takes place according to cycles, movements, and slow but perceptible rhythm that may span decades or more. It is also called “social time” which is slower than individual time, but with discernible rhythm. He explains:

[...] there can be distinguished another history, this time with slow but perceptible rhythms. If the expression had had not been diverted from its full meaning, one could call it social history, the history of groups and groupings (Braudel: 1995 (1949): 20).

What does the “conjuncture” focus on? The second part of the *Mediterranean* is devoted to economic, social and political structures: the economies (chapt. 1, 2), trade and transport (chapt. 3), empires (chapt. 4), societies (chapt. 5), civilizations (chapt. 6) and the forms of war (chapt. 7). Braudel paraphrases as follows:

Science, technology, political institutions, conceptual changes, civilization [...] all have their own rhythms of life and growth, and the new history of conjunctures will be complete only when it has made up a whole orchestra of them all (Braudel: 1980 (1969): 30).

The third is a very long-term perspective, the “longue duree” where change takes place at a slowest tempo, which sometimes borders on motionless, deeply embedded in structures of social life which last over centuries. His

introduction proceeds as follows:

The first part [of the Mediterranean] is devoted to a history whose passage is almost imperceptible, that of man in his relationship to the environment, a history in which all change is slow, a history of constant repetition, a history in cycles (Braudel: 1995 (1969): 20).

This time span is also called “geographical time” in which change is almost imperceptible, a history of repetition and recurring cycles over a very long period.

Geography in this context is no longer an end itself but a means to an end. It helps us to discover the almost imperceptible movement of history [...] (Braudel: 1995 (1969): 23).

Structure is another denotation bestowed to this long-term, motionless time.

By structure, observers of social questions mean an organization, a coherent and fairly fixed series of relationships between realities and social masses. [...] Some structures, because of their long life, become stable elements for an infinite number of generations (Braudel: 1980 (1969): 31).

(3) Combination of the components

With the combination of these two variables, we get diagram 1.

Cell 1 is an area where actions, interactions, choices, and perception of certain individuals are analyzed in short-span “individual” time. Cell 3 in contrast is an area where something structured in each individual human being is focused on. It would be reasonable to presume that “something structured in human beings” equals “human nature.” Braudel in fact cites “certain biological realities” as an example of hindrances in “longue duree” beyond which man and his experiences cannot go (Braudel: 1980(69): 31).

Diagram 1: General Framework

Levels of analysis

international	cell 7	cell 8	cell 9
state/domestic	cell 4	cell 5	cell 6
individual	cell 1	cell 2	cell 3
	short-span "events" individual time	medium-span "conjuncture" social time	long-span "longue duree" geographical time

action

institution

structure

faster ← → slower
 changeable ← → less changeable
 perceptible ← → less perceptible

Different speeds of time

Given this, what would constitute cell 2 in between? What characteristics or elements relevantly pertain to "individuals in groups and groupings" with "slow but perceptible change" in "social time?" When perceptions of certain individuals are internalized and passed down from generation to generation in a certain grouping of people, and when certain actions are so repeated as to be translated into institutionalized behavior, it would be valid to assert that they comprise part of *culture*. Culture does change. It is not a motionless, stable element for an infinite number of generations. It does not, however, "pass across its stage like fireflies." It has its own rhythm of life and growth. "Civilization" and "conceptual change," among the examples Braudel cites as elements of "conjuncture," may correspond to culture in cell 4.

"Events" within states, by definition, constitute cell 4. It concerns activities of state/government agencies, political parties, interest groups, media and various other actors that influence the state actions in an international arena. Events such as elections, riots, movements, and assassinations are among examples to be analyzed in this category. Cell 5 indicates political,

social, and economic systems under which or against which those actions are taken. Braudel specifies "political institutions" as an example requiring examination in the category of "conjuncture." The systems do change, albeit sometimes abruptly, with broader and slower rhythms. Cell 6 is a zone where the intrinsic nature of the state is to be analyzed. Hobbes designated this "nature" as Leviathan. How to conceive the eternal nature of the state often marks the departing point from where the various political thoughts and philosophies are constructed.

Cell 7 is an international arena where actions and interactions among states take place in a short time span. The activities of IGOs and INGOs are the main point of focus when they influence the course of "events" in international relations. Headlines in the international section of the newspaper are typical examples found in cell 7.

Cell 8 addresses international systems and regimes built upon over decades. Power distribution is a case in point as well. Also included are cycles of economic growth and declines imbedded in the structure of the international system. Braudel cites trade and transport patterns, price fluctuations, and forms of war as some examples of the "cycles and movements" which operate with slow but perceptible tempo. Cell 9 is the unchangeable nature of international structure. Its essence is one of anarchy in the sense that in an international arena there is no overarching central authority above the collection of autonomous states and political communities. In the strict Braudelian sense of the terminology, cell 9 should start with the Earth, where international politics is played out. Geographical and environmental factors are, however, placed outside the purview of this paper. Diagram 1-1 is our reformulated general framework. The denomination in each cell is not exhaustive but offers illustrative representation of the elements in the category.

Diagram 1-2: reformulated general framework

international	7 interactions among states and nonstate actors	8 international system	9 anarchy
state/domestic	4 domestic political activities & state behavior	5 political, social economic system	6 nature of state
individual	1 individual actions and personalities	2 culture	3 human nature
	short-span "events" individual time	medium-span "conjuncture" social time	long-span "longue duree" geographical time

(4) Advantages

This framework has three analytical advantages:

First, it better serves the original purpose of Waltz's delving into the causes of war. The framework provides us with a perspective to overview the causes and cures of the war in contradistinction to each other. Additionally, it supplies us a heuristic channel through which to explore the hypotheses regarding what causes war. In terms of our schema, for example, Walt's first image exclusively addresses cell 3: "human nature" (Waltz: 1959: 16-79). It has been pointed out, however, that if we want to know what caused the outbreak of war, we need to understand the individuals who were responsible for those decisions (Cashman: 1991: 37). In this paradigm the cause of war lies primarily in the actions, (mis)perceptions, choices, and psychological makeup of particular political leaders, hence located in cell 1 in our framework. Cell 2 conversely suggests that between these two cells, the unchangeable human nature on one hand and the brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations of particular political leaders on the other, lie "cultural factors" which breed mistrust, suspicion, prejudice and bigotry among peoples in the world.

In Waltz's second image the cause of war is solely attributed to cell 5 in our framework: the defects of internal structure of states. Closely examined were the theories of Marxism and imperialism (defects of an economic system), the

despotic nature of government (defects of political systems) and the inconsistency with national units (defects of a social system). The proposed cures are consequently the abolition of private ownership (the Marxian solution), the establishment of modern democratic organizations (the Kantian solution) and the national self-determination (the Wilsonian solution) respectively (Waltz: 1959:80-123). On the other hand, cell 4, the short-term and domestic level in our framework, indicates some more alternative hypotheses to be examined. Flaws in governmental decision making in crisis, such as Groupthink and Incrementalism, are notable examples. Likewise the "diversion theory" falls into cell 4, which holds that a state plagued with internal strife is likely to resort to the use of force outside to bring unity inside. It is juxtaposed in cell 4 due to the fact that the whole process works itself out in "individual time." Conversely, the evolution of the state is intimately bound up with the history of war. Cell 6 presupposes the locus of the view which posits that violence is built not only into the "state of nature" but also into "the nature of state." By the same token, theories of escalation in hostility, the defects in the international system, and the very nature of anarchical structure in the international arena are situated in cell 7, 8, and 9 respectively. The framework thus furnishes us with a wider view of the range of hypotheses regarding the causes of war.

Second, the framework enables us to juxtapose the basic logical structures of the main IR perspectives. This is made available in three ways. First, it helps us grasp more precisely where the independent variables or determinant factors are located in each perspective. Second, it assists us in comparing the various IR perspectives more explicitly by visualizing how different perspectives characterize each "cell" differently. Their basic views on humans, states, and IR are elucidated in the same framework. More importantly, by showing which "cells" lie outside the theoretical scope of which perspectives, the framework coherently specifies the assumptions, priorities, and coverage of the diverse IR perspectives. Third, by linking the "cells" with causal arrows and employing deductive reasoning, the framework, albeit in a simplified manner, facilitates our pivotal understanding of the logical structures of each perspective.

Although the following diagrams are intended to be self-explanatory,

extracts from popular textbooks are provided as footnotes to clarify the point. The diagrams also offer a foundational basis to examine the concept of human security in the latter part of this paper.

Diagram 2 -1 Classical Realism: basic logical structure

Determinant explanatory factors main explanatory factors

7 endless struggle for power <international politics>	8 balance of power <international system>	9 anarchical <international structure>
4 power maximization <state behavior>	5 national interest <state attributes>	6 sovereign <nature of state>
1 (out of scope) <individual actions>	2 (out of scope) <culture>	3 evil selfish <human nature>


In classical realism, cell 3 <human nature> is the determinant factor. As shown in the words of Morgenthau, “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau: 1985: 4). Human nature stands outside history and cannot be transcended. In Braudel’s words, certain biological realities beyond which man and his experiences cannot go. The human factor plays a decisive role in classical realists reasoning. “For all classical realists, *all* politics is an expression of the same human drives and subject to the same pathologies” (Brown: 2007: 54 emphasis in original).

Diagram 2-2 Structural Realism: basic logical structure

7 struggle for relative gains (equilibrium) ← (disequilibrium) ← <international politics>	8 power distributions (bi-polarity) ← (multi-polarity) <international system>	9 anarchical nature <international structure>
4 relative gains maximization <state behavior>	5 different capabilities <state position>	6 system units < nature of state>
1 (out of scope) <individual actions>	2 (out of scope) <culture>	3 (out of scope) <human nature>

In structural realism, contrastively, precedence is awarded to international structures and systems. “It is not human nature, but the anarchical system which fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion and insecurity” (Dunne and Schmidt: 2001: 149). “Unlike Morgenthau, he [Kenneth Waltz] gives no account of human nature and ignores the ethics of statecraft” (Jackson and Sorensen: 1998: 85). In terms of our framework, he ignores cell 3 <human nature> and cell 1 <political finesse of individual leaders>.

Diagram 2-3 Classical Liberalism: basic logical structure



It is perhaps no less dangerous and even reckless to lump together Locke, Bentham, Kant, Montesquieu, and Woodrow Wilson under the common rubric of classical liberalism than to group together Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Morgenthau under the label of Classical Realism. What the liberals have in common, it is generally pointed out, is a positive view of human nature. “Liberalism holds that human nature is basically good and people can improve their moral and material conditions, making societal progress possible” (Mingst: 2003: 63). Furthermore, liberals have “great faith in human reason and they are convinced that rational principles can be applied to international affairs” (Jackson and Sorensen: 1999: 108). In their perspective, harmony of interests in an international arena becomes possible and attainable through institutional reforms and collective action. The expansion of human freedom through democracy and market economy will result in a harmony of interests among states.

Diagram 2-4 Neo Liberalism (institutionalism): basic logical structure

7 continuous interactions cooperation IGOs <international politics>	8 repeated prisoner's dilemma international regimes? <international systems?>	9 anarchy <international structures>
4 seeking self-interest <state behavior>	5 rational game player <state attributes>	6 <nature of state>
1 (out of scope) <individual actions>	2 (out of scope) <culture>	3 (out of scope) <human nature>

There are several variants of the “neo-liberal” approaches. Here the focus of attention is given to “neo-liberal institutionalism”. Classical liberals and neo-liberals arrive at the same conclusion that cooperation is possible in the international arena [cell 7]. They differ greatly in their assumptions and deductive reasoning. Whereas classical liberals start from the assumption that individuals naturally cooperate out of an intrinsic innate characteristic of humanity, neo-liberals depart from the supposition that states are rational players under the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma [cell 5, 8]. An international regime [cell 8] provides a viable institutional framework which guarantees continuous interactions for both “players”. International institutions thereby render it in the self-interest of each player to cooperate. “Neo-liberal institutionalists see ‘institutions’ as the mediator and the means to achieve cooperation among actors in the system” (Lamy: 2001: 189).

Diagram 2-5 Constructivism : basic logical structures

7 Norm construction at IGOs and INGOs <international politics>	8 international norm regimes <international system>	9 (out of scope) intersubjectively constructed <international structure>
4 state policy adoption <state behavior>	5 state identity <state attributes>	6 (out of scope) intersubjectively constructed <nature of state>
1 norm invention <individual activities>	2 norm socialization <culture>	3 (out of scope) <human nature>

- cell 1 norm invention by “norm entrepreneur”
- cell 1 → cell 4 norm adoption by state policy
- cell 1,4 → cell 7 norm diffusion in international arena
- cell 1 → cell 2 norm internalization
- cell 4 → cell 5 norm institutionalization
- cell 7 → cell 4 norm authorization
- cell 2 → cell 4 norm legitimization

As for the remaining perspectives, only a graphic representation by the diagram is available in a hasty and summary fashion. Diagram 2-5 is designed to shed light on an important aspect of constructivism. Unlike the other approaches, it pays special attention to norms and identities, but at the same time it does not take them as a given. Constructivists focus on “how inter-subjective practices between actors result in identities and interests being formed in the processes of interaction rather than being formed prior to interaction” (Smith: 2001: 244). In the words of Wendt, as frequently quoted, “There is no ‘logic’ of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has not existence or causal powers apart from process” (Wendt: 1992: 395). Anarchy thereby therefore is not a deterministically given variable.

The perspectives of the Radical approaches are only schematically illustrated in the tables below. These seven diagrams will provide foundational basis in cross-examining the future of “human security” in the next chapter.

Diagram 2-6: Classical Marxism and Imperialism




Diagram 2-7: World System Perspective

7 <international politics>	8 stratification: core, semi-capitalist world economy periphery, periphery ~ 16 th century <international system>	
4 development underdevelopment <domestic societies>	5 core: strong state periphery: weak state <state attributes>	6 <nature of state>
1 <individual actions>	2 <culture>	3 <human nature>

2 Applications

(1) Human rights

Based on the above argument, I now proceed to apply the framework to viewing the concept of human security. Commenting on the life expectancy of concepts and words, Galtung states as follows:

A human condition, like the plight of misery, stays on, but "poverty elimination" may retire from the front stage like "community development", "self-reliance", "new economic world order" did, and even "women in development" will do. Cruel, but such is the life cycle of concepts (Galtung, 2005:1).

Is it not the case, however, that "such is the life cycle of *most* concepts" with notable exceptions? Certainly it is hard to deny that so many concepts sink into oblivion either because "the paradigm underlying the concept has been exhausted" or because a younger generation may have wanted a new concept as a bypass to get "rapid access to the top" (Galtung: 2005:1). However, there are a few concepts which succeed and survive. They are invented, accepted, institutionalized, and structured at each level in our "mental frame" as well as in our social framework.

Diagram 3 is an attempt to trace a brief history of a successful and preceding concept: human rights. Under what conditions do concepts succeed? Under what conditions do norms prevail?

Diagram 3-1 Pathway of a “successful” concept: e.g. “human rights”

international	7 conventions declarations	8 international human rights regime	9
state/domestic	4 adoption movements	5 legalization in domestic political system	6 human rights violator/protector
individual	1 acceptance invention	2 internalization into norms and ethics	3 “natural rights” (invented)
	short-span “events” individual time	medium-span “conjuncture” social time	long-span “longue duree” geographical time

First the concept was invented, and gradually gained acceptance among individuals [cell 1]. Even though tracing the origins of human rights may be a politically charged embarkation, the modern conceptions of human rights owe the incontestable debt to the European Enlightenment. Micheline Ishay states, “The Enlightenment thinkers not only *invented* the language of human rights discourses, they discussed issues that continue to occupy current human rights debate” (Ishay: 2004: 8: italics added). The invented concept subsequently activated political movements, including petitions, riots, and revolutions in domestic settings [cell 4]. Later it was legalized and codified in the positive laws of the domestic political and legal systems in certain countries [cell 5]. The U.S. Bill of Rights of 1791 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 both heralded the embodiment of this notion into the domestic legal and political institutions. In a parallel way, through the education as well as through political and social movements, the idea was planted in people’s minds as basic norms and ethics [from cell 1/cell 4 to cell 2]. The notion was implanted in some cultures that humans are right bearers by virtue of their common humanity.

It was not until after W.W.II that the concept of human rights was substantiated in the international arena. This resulted in various forms of

resolutions, conventions, declarations and documentations [cell 7]. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly was “the first time in history that the international community had attempted to define a comprehensive code for the internal government of its members” (Brown: 2003: 606). The declaration was translated into more than 200 languages, which had enormous impact not only on spreading the philosophy of human rights [from cell 7 to cell 3], but also on inspiring the legal texts and decision making in the domestic arena [from cell 7 to cell 4, 5]. Despite the normative revolution signaled by the adoption of this declaration, Tim Dunn points out, “the institutionalization of human rights principles has been a long and incomplete journey” (Dunne: 2007: 142). With a complex network of international law, practice, treaties and legalization of human rights norms, however, slowly but steadily has emerged what can be termed the International Human Rights Regime. “By the late 1990s about 140 states had formally adhered to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the companion International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. [...] The 1949 Geneva Conventions were formally accepted by virtually all states [...]. In the fall of 1993 the UN General Assembly approved of the creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights. [...] Human rights had been internationalized, and internationally recognized rights had become routinized” (Forsythe: 2000: 4-5). In the Braudelian term, the human rights regime has begun to operate with “slower and broader rhythms” at the international level (cell 8). International conventions and declarations are “events” which appear in the headlines of the paper. The spectacular “events” can, however, “pass across its stage like fireflies”. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights could have been the “ephemera of history” if it had failed to be followed by the growing body of international law and diplomatic practices, which can be located in our schema in cell 8. The history of human rights has already its own “rhythms of life and growth”.

It is obvious that the concept of human rights does not belong to the “longue duree” in which change is almost imperceptible, motionless and of constant repetition. It is not a history of imperceptible movement or of stable elements for an infinite number of generations. Cells 3, 6, and 9 should be left blank in the strict Braudelian sense of the definition. It was the genius of the natural

rights advocates and the social contract theorists who associated, in their argument, human rights with human nature (cell 3) and state nature (cell 6) respectively. The former claimed that individuals possess human rights simply by virtue of being humans; in our terminology, the idea was invented that human rights are “structured” into human nature [cell 3]. Underlying the whole concept of human rights lies an awareness that the state has so much destructive capacity as to easily violate human rights. In this respect, states are “by nature” the violators of human rights [cell 6]. Another version of the social contract theories held that states were created out of the “state of nature” primarily to protect human rights. The “intrinsic nature of the state” [cell 6] is thereby deemed to be that of human rights protector. Jack Donnelly correctly depicts the Janus-faced nature of states as “principal violator and essential protector” of human rights (Donnelly: 2003: 35). Human rights are protected against the states and by the states.

Not only does the framework enable us to trace the trajectories of the concept, it provides us with a looking-glass through which to focus on the obstacles and issues the concept has encountered. It is schematically illustrated as the “friction” between different cells.

<cell 8 vs. cell 5> Ratification and Compliance/Enforcement

The friction between the sovereignty (cell 5) and internationally established norms (cell 8) presents two issues: the legal issue of ratification and the moral and practical issue of compliance/enforcement. Treaties may be signed, but may not be legally ratified by domestic legislature. Even if ratified, there is little guarantee that governments will live up to their commitments to human rights. As Nicholas Wheeler points out, “Securing compliance with global humanitarian norms is one of the key challenges facing the societies of states in the next fifty years” (Wheeler: 2003: 169). There is “a fundamental contradiction between new norms of human rights in the United Nations Charter, and the lack of a UN human rights court to enforce them” (Forsythe: 2000: 55). Norms established in cell 8 can easily be “eviscerated” both legally and practically in the realm of cell 5.

<cell 8 vs. cell 2 / cell 3 vs. cell 2> Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism

The words in the Vienna Declaration of Human Rights of 1993 assert the need to keep in mind “the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical cultural and religious backgrounds.” Still earlier, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 1981 stated to the effect that peoples have the rights to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources, and the individual has a duty to serve his natural community and to preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values. Jackson-Preece argues that “cultural pluralism is an essential feature and important value of the human condition. For this reason, pluralism ought to be actively promoted rather than tolerated within the liberal human rights discourse since it is only in situations of social pluralism that freedom can be fully realized” (Jackson-Preece: 2003: 50). The proposition of the third generation rights evoked the issue of universalism revolving around the concept of human rights. Do the rights have foundational basis in “universally acknowledged” international regimes (cell 8) or in particular political and legal systems (cell 5)? Are they instead grounded in universal “human nature” (cell 3), or rooted in particular “cultural values” (cell 2)? The latter insists that human rights be defined, defended and implemented in strictly cultural terms.

(2) Human Security

What relevance does the above analysis bear on the concept of human security? First and foremost it is obvious that the history of the concept of human security is, in contrast to the case of human rights, very brief. The trajectory of the concept can only be traced within “individual time” (cell 1, 4, 7) in our framework. Hitherto, however, the concept has held considerable success in terms of “popularity”. It has gone into the documents of the UNDP, the UN, and many other intergovernmental organizations [cell 7]. It was incorporated into the official foreign policies of Canada, Japan and Norway, to name but a few [cell 4]. Only in the future we will be able to judge whether or not it will grow into “adulthood” by successfully entering the cells beyond 2, 5, and 8. Where does the initial success lie, and what are the conditions under which this word can “stay around to change the world”, as words such

as human rights did in the past decades and centuries? This section addresses these issues based on the application of the above argument and framework.

Diagram 3-2: the trajectory of “human security”

7 Norm construction at IGOs and INGOs <international politics>	8 (international norm regimes?) <international system>	9 <international structure>
4 state policy adoption <state behavior>	5 (state identity?) <state attributes>	6 <nature of state>
1 invention of idea <individual activities>	2 (norm socialization?) <culture>	3 (out of scope) <human nature>
“events”	“conjecture”	“longue duree”

Events in the “individual time” are as follows:

1 Mahbub ul Haq and others	early 1990's
7 UNDP Human Development Report	1994
Human Security Now	2003
4 Japan	1998
Canada, Norway & Human Security Network	1999

From the onset of these “events”, the whole process has received intensive attention from scholars of various fields. There has been an explosion of papers regarding the definition of the term. According to the “folklore” of human security, Bajpai insinuates based on his personal conversation, “Lincoln Chen is reported to have coined the term” (Bajpai, 2003: 198 ft). Kurusu Kaoru attempted to analyze the “editing” process from cell 1 (the invention by the advocates) to cell 7 (the incorporation by the various international commissions), and the “re-modeling (re-writing)” process from cell 7 (the 1994 UNDP report) to cell 4 (the adoption by Canadian and Japanese governments) (Kurusu: 2005: 83-85). Newman proposes a research agenda by asserting “Research should be directed at deepening the understanding of the evolving security agenda and demonstrating how this understanding can be translated into viable policy options” (Newman, 2001: 249). He names the title of this research agenda “selling” human security to

governments, but “buying” would be a more accurate term to describe this process (Sato:2005). The empirical research of the history of Human Security approach in the past decade and a half is out of the scope of this paper. Instead I would like to compare the above Diagram 3-2 first with Diagram 3-1 of the pathway of “human rights”, and then with Diagram 2-1 to 2-7 on the main IR perspectives.

Diagram 3-2 vs. Diagram 3-1

Diagram 3-1 indicated the friction between the cells. Is “human security” likely to avoid the pitfalls or challenges waiting ahead? The tension between cell 8 and cell 5, between the universally proclaimed Rights of Man and the sovereignty of states, is the conundrum Hannah Arendt had earlier identified: the fundamental contradiction between civil rights and the eternal Rights of Man. She states:

The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable- even in countries whose constitutions were based upon them - whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state. To this fact, one must add the confusion created by the many recent attempts to frame a new bill of human rights, which have demonstrated that no one seems able to define with any assurance what these general human rights, as distinguished from the rights of citizens, really are (Arendt: 1951:293).

If human security is strictly defined as the security of people independent of citizenship and nationality, and if any government were to adhere to the principle in the true sense of the term, they should first and foremost abandon the immigration restriction to welcome “people on the move” the 2003 Human Security Report emphatically designated to be protected in its chapter 2. For refugees, and even for internally displaced persons, “What is unprecedented is not the loss of home but the impossibility of finding a new one” (Arendt: 1951: 293).

There is no guarantee that the new concept “human security” can be free

from the tension “human rights” were plagued with just because it is new.

Diagram 3-2 vs. Diagram 2- 1 ~ 7

The whole process within the individual time was most compatible with the constructivist diagram 2-5 we prepared in the former section. Characterization of each cell and sequential directions roughly correspond to each other between two diagrams.

cell 1		norm invention by “norm entrepreneur”: Haq and others
cell 1	→	cell 4 norm adoption by state policy: Japan, Canada, Norway
cell 1,4	→	cell 7 norm diffusion in the international arena: UNDP report (1994) Human Security Now (2003)

Diagram 2-5 on Constructivist approach provided us with a scenario as follows:

<process>

cell 1	→	cell 2	norm internalization
cell 4	→	cell 5	norm legalization
cell 7	→	cell 8	norm institutionalization

<influences>

cell 7	→	cell 4	norm authorization
cell 2	→	cell 4	norm legitimization

In their conception, states, international organizations and NGOs must combine to foster norms of conduct in various areas of human security. “The spread of norms must be accompanied by the invigoration of global institutions” (Bajpai: 2003: 213). The definitive work on the norm creation process is already conducted by Finnemore and Sikkink (Finnemore and Sikkink: 1998). Hence, instead of following the footsteps of the constructivist approach, it is theoretically more fruitful here to cross examine Diagram 3-2 with the other IR approaches: Diagram 2-1(classical realism), Diagram 2-2 (structural realism), Diagram 2-3 (classical liberalism), Diagram 2-4 (neo-liberalism), Diagram 2-6 (Marxism), and Diagram 2-7 (the World

System approach). It is done in two steps.

First, the norm creation process in cells 1, 4, 7 is treated as “endeavors” within the individual time-span. Braudel concludes the *Mediterranean* with the following insightful phrases.

I would conclude with the paradox that the true man of action is he who can measure most nearly the constraints upon him, who chooses to remain with them and even to take advantage of the weight of the inevitable, exerting his own pressure in the same direction. All efforts against the prevailing tide of history which is not always obvious are doomed to failure (Braudel: 1995[1949]: 1243-449)

Indeed, “all efforts against the prevailing tide of history” did fail. The League of Nations could be a typical example cited in the history of international politics. The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928 may be another notable instance. In Braudel’s conception on the other hand, efforts in the same direction are most likely to succeed. In another essay, Braudel states, “all of [the structures] provide both support and hindrance” (Braudel: 1980[1969]: 31). How then do we identify “the prevailing tide of history” which can be both support and a hindrance? The prevailing tides are of course found in the conjuncture and the *longue duree*. Second, I would like to “mesh” the concept of human security with the diagrams mentioned above with a view to measuring as nearly as possible the support and hindrances which it is likely to encounter in the future.

Classical realism as shown in diagram 2-1 suggests that states “buy” any ideas as their policy options as long as they are likely to enhance their power [cell 4 in diagram 2-1]. The adoption of “human security” by the Japanese government as a foreign policy slogan is not, in this analytical perspective, unrelated to its intention to become a permanent member of the Security Council (Tosa: 2003:112). The Bureaucratic Politics Model will also indicate that the very term “human security” serves the interests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fact that it can be successfully differentiated from “human rights”. “Human rights” almost automatically falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The new term thus helped the MOFA

obtain new sources of budget and new tools of leverage in intra-governmental politics. Whether the "human security approach" is going to be built into the institutional framework of the Japanese government will accordingly hinge on its consistency with **national interests** [cell 5 in diagram 2-1]. Conversely, the term serves the interests of Canada and Norway in that it enables them to distinguish themselves as progressive "Middle Powers." Being the only country outside the European Union besides Iceland, Norway adopted the concept as a vehicle to break its potential isolation and to create a broad platform for cooperation with regard to humanitarian causes. Suhrke introduces the view as follows: "By initiating a global coalition of states on 'human security issues', Norway could take a step towards what a former foreign affairs official grandly described as 'humanitarian large power status'" (Suhrke: 1999: 267). Diagram 2-1 of classical realism therefore postulates the congruence with the national interests as the key conditions under which the norm "human security" can survive.

In diagram 2-2 representing Structural Realism, the main determinant factors are located at the "system" level. Uneven power distribution [cell 8] is conceived as playing a crucial role in determining whether or not the declarations and resolutions of "human security" in IGOs will grow into "International Human Security Regimes?" The Human Security approach will have a head-on clash with the dominant international structure. It must become common a concern for not only "middle powers" but also for "great powers". Whether bipolar, unipolar, or multipolar, a regime is conceived to be workable only under the condition that it is backed by "strong powers". Likewise, in Structural Realists' perception, cooperation under the common umbrella of "human security" becomes problematic if the gains to be obtained are distributed unevenly among participating states. Among the seven components of "human security" articulated in the 1994 UNDP report, environmental and economic security may most likely engender the relative gains issue. This concern is instantly translated into that of cheating, which may turn out to be more troublesome. In other words, concern over uneven distribution of "negative relative gains", that is "cost", is at stake here. Uneven sharing of cost constitutes the free-rider problem. Who is going to pay the bill in the end?

Diagram 2-3 of Classical Liberalism offers us quite a different picture. Humans are, in this view, presupposed to bring out their best innate character through developing optimal institutions both at the domestic level [cell 5] and at the international system level [cell 8], thus making cooperation among states possible in the international arena [cell 7]. Through learning and education [cell 2], humans are expected to bring out the best of their nature [cell 3]. Is the ideal of “human security,” however, compatible with their strong belief in democracy and a market economy? Is the realization of human security on a global scale possible without “excessive” governmental control, which is a perennial nemesis of classical liberalists? In the light of democracy which classical liberalists hold, is it not the case that the internal (domestic) equality is based on the external (global) inequality? Democracy is intrinsically linked to “nationality” just as human rights were or still are inseparable from citizenship.

According to the view of neo-liberal institutionalists illustrated in diagram 2-4, we do not have to depend upon the innate good will of people or humans to bring about cooperation on the international stage. Required instead are effective international institutions to monitor possible “cheating” by free-riders. In general the more participants there are, the more likely free-riding emerges. “Human security” is thus conceived to be a public good, which needs to be supplied by some kind of supra-national organizations or coalitions created from a few countries. If not, one alternative would be the privatization of “human security” – the formation of businesses that act in the self-interests of rational actors.

With diagrams 2-3 and 2-4 put together, liberal approaches may be classified depending on which cell different approaches depart from. Democratization thesis departs from cell 5: human’s innate nature (cell 3) and individual’s best quality and good intentions (cell 1) both come into being through democratic institutions, resulting in the best governance for the domestic setting (cell 4) and peace in the international arena (cell 7). Whether promoting democratic values at home will lead to the promotion of human security abroad is again quite a different issue. There is no invisible hand at work here to provide for human security on a global scale. Economic

interdependence thesis departs from cell 7, emphasizing the importance of "the less regulation the better" principle. Increased interdependence may reduce the incentive to use military force among states as a means to settle disputes and raise the cost of resorting to it. The same increased interdependence makes some states stronger while other states all the weaker. This is where the notion of human security comes from. The cosmopolitan approach which occupies cell 1, the actions of individuals, as its starting point will most fit the idea of human security. The liberal-cosmopolitans have high expectations of the role transnational actors such as INGOs play in bringing about change in international relations. In their perception, those actors are expected to provide human security independent of nationality or citizenship.

According to classical Marxist views, the human security project is feasible in so far as it serves the interests of the ruling economic classes. In this conception, norms or ideas are understood as mere ideologies that mask and promote the interests of the ruling classes. The Marxists warn of the possibility that assisting developing countries in being "free from want" only results in the perpetuation of authoritarian or predatory regimes in those countries. They put forward that human security causes only provide strong capitalist states or ruling military-industry complex sectors with opportunities to advance their own economic interests by invoking seemingly liberal views. In this way they criticize both realism and liberalism, neo or classical.

The world-system perspective holds that the human security approach will at best only contribute to the continuation of the triadic structure of core, semi-periphery, and periphery. In the world system view, countries in the periphery lack strong central governments, equipped with fragile colonial economies, dependent on the export of raw material to the core zones. As long as this exploitive system is maintained, there necessarily emerges a number of failed states which cannot provide basic human needs to the people. Human security in the true sense of the term is attainable only after the demise of the capitalist world economy.

3 Reformulated Framework

Kenneth Boulding has once remarked in his classical book, "The Image", that behavior depends on the image. "The meaning of the message is", on the other hand, "the change which it produces" (Boulding: 1961: 6-7). The concept of human security had a message which changed our image. Paraphrasing Boulding, David Koten states that we organize our knowledge into a personal image of the world, which serves as a kind of *map* in guiding our behavior. To understand behavior, we need to understand the image. To change behavior, we must change the image [Koten: 1999: 5]. The concept of human security has successfully changed our image of the world, but how?

In diagrams 4-1 and 4-3, the sources of insecurity or "threats" are spotted in our framework of analysis as conceived by traditional state security and human security respectively. In the former traditional security, threats are identified only at the international level: "invasion" by the foreign troops in a short time span, a power imbalance or security dilemma within a medium time span, and an anarchical nature of international structure. Security means employed to cope with these threats are easily identified in each cell, which are shown in diagram 4-1-2.

Diagram 4-1 Sources of Insecurity (threats): Traditional State Security

international	7 invasion	8 imbalance of power	9 anarchy
state/domestic	4	5	6
individual	1	2	3
	individual time	social time	geographical time

4-1-2 Security Means: Traditional State Security

international	7 alliance formation	8 balancing / band wagoning	9
state/domestic	4 military buildup	5 state power maximization	6
individual	1 patriotism	2 nationalism	3
	individual time	social time	geographical time

In contrast, the human security perspective immediately requires the framework to be expanded by adding another level of analysis, namely the global/transnational level. In identifying the sources of threats, Nicholas Thomas and William Tow make important distinctions between, in our terminology, the domestic level of analysis and the transnational level of analysis. Their approach “involves focusing on those events that *transcend* state borders in terms of their impact on different societies and diverse individuals. Within a given state, events or problems such as those relating to food distribution, gender discrimination and basic shelter are usually contained and resolved within the state’s sovereign boundaries and are thus best viewed as development problems” (Thomas & Tow: 2002: 179). Within the state sovereign border, however, lay awareness that the state was a possible greatest aggressor to people concerned.

Diagram 4-3 Sources of Insecurity (threats): Human Security

Transnational /global level	drug trafficking	Economic disparities	environmental degradation
	global epidemic	excessive migration	unchecked population growth
International level
	oppressive government	Ethnic / religious divisions
state/domestic	absence of governance	state disintegration	
	crime / hunger	cultural integrity	
Individual level
	individual time	social time	geographical time

The 1994 UNDP report designated seven pillars which build up the content of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Each category lists various sources of insecurity. It might appear, at first sight, that the sources are scattered on all over the levels of analysis, ranging from personal, health, and community (individual) to food, economic, and political (domestic/state/international) to environmental (global/transnational) levels. Given the view of Thomas and Tow, however, it is analytically more fruitful to categorize them only at the state/domestic and at the transnational/global levels. Poverty, hunger, domestic violence, and crime may appear purely personal matter, but these

“threats” to the individuals are usually contained and should be resolved within state boundaries. In other words, *ontologically*, all threats exist at the individual level, since individuals are by definition the only security referent. But *epistemologically*, I am arguing for the treatment of placing the threats either at the transnational level or at the domestic level. With the advancement of globalization, some problems, such as global warming, drug-trafficking, the sudden back-lash to globalization, the spread of the new-flu virus, transnational terrorism, proliferation of the WMD, etc., are now too enormous or too complicated for any single government to tackle effectively. Those issues transcend state boundaries because of their magnitude of scope or their elusiveness of character for any efficient single state to grasp hold of. These problems are effectively addressed only through regional or global cooperation. What needs to be stressed here is that regional or global cooperation is possible only under the conditions that states are stably functioning. In other words, some problems transcend state boundaries even when states are viably in operation. Those threats are hence plotted at a transnational level in our framework. On the other hand, there exists two sets of problems located at the domestic level. One is the case where states are threats to people domestically through their oppressive rule. The other is the case where states have collapsed and are fragmented. Many of the threats listed in the seven pillars of human security components fall under this category of “usually contained and resolved within the state’s sovereign boundaries”. It is this aspect that the Japanese government stresses in deploying its resources as Human Security Fund. This consideration suggests that in the long run, the issue of human security will have to go back to the issue of states.

The proposed concept changed our image by presenting us a very different picture of the whole notion of “security”. It was indeed a shift in perspective. As Suhrke points out, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. “It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as a point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments” (Suhrke: 1999: 269). In the words of Boulding, it changed our image, and consequently changed our behavior.

After the initial success, however, “human security” is bound to meet with a

legion of challenges and problems before it is institutionalized. First, it is going to be discarded, just like a map, if it does not take us to the right destination. This refers to the policy utility of the concept. Second, if there are too many maps to choose from, it will lose its credibility. This refers to the issue of conceptual clarity.

Conclusion

Kanti Bajpai concludes his paper on the idea of human security by asserting as follows: “The point of human security studies at this stage is to describe a map of violence that goes well beyond the map created by the neo-realist/statist view of security” (Bajpai: 2003: 228). This study is part of a broader trend in the study of human security with the aim of proving a “broader map” than the one created by traditional state-centric security studies. The views and hypothetical propositions are provisionally illustrated in the reformulated framework in Diagram 5.

Diagram 5 Human Security viewed from IR

levels	time span	sources of insecurity	security means	Challenges	main actors
individual	short	protection and empowerment	minimum security or maximum self-fulfillment	empowered individuals?
	mid	human development	Who pays the bill?	
	long	(degeneration / loss of natural habitat / survival as species)	
domestic	short	violence / poverty / ill-health / illiteracy / crime, unemployment	aid, humanitarian intervention,	clashes with "national interests" of "donors" clashes with "sovereignty" of "donees"	governments NGOs
	mid	absence of governance / political oppression discrimination / deprivation	viable and democratic state building	state-strength dilemma	
	long	internal ethnic, religious cleavage	(formation of optimum political community)	(validity of nation-state as a format)	
international	short	traditional state security invasion	military buildup	economic constraints: guns or butter	states
	mid	power imbalances	power maximization	security dilemma	
	long	anarchical nature	
transnational/ global	short	drug trafficking, spread of WMD, financial crisis, natural calamities	regional or global cooperation	perpetuation of life-saving activities? burden sharing of international public goods	IGOs states INGOs
	mid	population movement, economic disparities	international human security regime building	perpetuation of global economic/ political stratification	
	long	unchecked population growth, environmental degradation	30 (formation of optimum world order)	anarchy or monarchy?	

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